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Prior Consistent Statements: The Dangers of Misinterpreting
Recently Amended FRE 801(d)(1)(B)*

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) has long provided that prior
statements consistent with the testimony of a witness who is subject to crossexamination may be introduced and used as substantive evidence when offered “to
rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted
from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying.” At the end of 2014, the
rule was amended also to allow prior consistent statements to be introduced as
substantive evidence when offered “to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a
witness when attacked on another ground.”

When the Federal Judicial Center circulated the proposed amendment to
federal district judges for comment, they overwhelmingly predicted that the
amendment would lead to a significant expansion in attempts to introduce prior
consistent statements at trial, even though this was not the purpose of the
amendment. See FJC Survey,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule801d1b.pdf/$file/rule801d1b.pdf
To respond to this concern, the Advisory Committee added a Note to the amended
rule specifically stating: “This amendment does not change the traditional and wellaccepted limits on bringing prior consistent statements before the factfinder for
credibility purposes. It does not allow impermissible bolstering of a witness. . . . The
amendment does not make any consistent statement admissible that was not
admissible previously—the only difference is that prior consistent statements
otherwise admissible for rehabilitation are now admissible substantively as well.”
(emphasis added)

Nonetheless, a significant danger remains that the amended rule will be
misunderstood by lawyers and judges and applied in an overly expansive fashion.
This is not only because Advisory Committee Notes are sometimes overlooked or
ignored in the heat of trial, but also because the amended rule does not itself specify
when prior consistent statements may be used to rehabilitate witnesses. Instead it
adopts federal common law on the issue of when prior consistent statements are
admissible for rehabilitation and merely provides that if a prior consistent
statement is admissible for rehabilitation, it is also admissible for its truth. Thus, to
apply the amendment properly attorneys and courts must research and consider
law outside FRE 801(d)(1)(B).

This point would have been made clearer if the drafters had added just three
words to the amended language, so that it read “when otherwise admissible to
rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on another
ground.” As a leading academic commentator has noted, the absence of those words
means that lawyers and judges may “be lulled into thinking that the rehabilitation
requirement is automatically satisfied for any prior consistent statement falling
within the amended rule” and misinterpret the rule “to bless and automatically
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admit any prior consistent statement offered to repair an impeaching attack.” Liesa
Richter, Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements, 46 Conn. L. Rev. 937,
983 (2015).

Even those lawyers and judges who recognize that proper application of FRE
801(d)(1)(B) requires resort to law outside the rule itself face a challenge, because
there is no other provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence addressing
rehabilitation by use of prior consistent statements. Instead they must look to the
federal common law. The Advisory Committee’s Note says the amended rule is
subject to the “traditional and well-accepted limits” on admitting prior consistent
statements for rehabilitation, but it does not detail what they are.

Perhaps the most fundamental common law limitation on the use of prior
consistent statements is that they cannot be introduced to rehabilitate a witness
after every kind of impeaching attack, despite the language in the rule about using
prior consistent statements to rehabilitate after the witness has been attacked “on
another ground.” For example, impeachment by evidence of prior convictions, prior
bad acts, bad character for truthfulness, and failure of perception (such as bad
eyesight) do not ordinarily provide a basis to rehabilitate a witness by introducing a
prior consistent statement. See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, 4 Federal Evidence §§8.38,
8.39 (4th ed. 2013).
The only two types of attack mentioned in the Advisory Committee Note as
potentially being covered by the amended language are a charge of “faulty memory”
and evidence of “an inconsistency in the witness’s testimony.” Certainly an attack
on a witness’s memory should trigger the right to rehabilitate the witness by
evidence of a consistent statement made at or near the time of the event about
which she is testifying. But even here caution is in order. A charge of faulty memory
does not open the door to all prior consistent statements. For example, if a witness
is challenged about her ability to remember the details of an accident she observed
four years ago, it does not rehabilitate her to bring out a consistent statement she
made at a deposition two weeks prior to her current testimony.

Similarly it has never been the rule that impeachment by prior inconsistent
statement automatically opens the door to evidence of prior consistent statements.
See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, id. at §6.102. Proving prior consistent statements does
not remove the sting of vacillation raised by the inconsistent statements because the
inconstancy remains. Only in certain limited circumstances does a prior consistent
statement rehabilitate a witness who has been impeached with a prior inconsistent
statement. For example, a prior consistent statement may rehabilitate a witness by
clarifying or giving context to the alleged prior inconsistent statement or by
supporting a denial that the prior inconsistent statement was ever made. And of
course sometimes impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement will suggest that
the direct testimony of the witness is a recent fabrication or a product of improper
influence or motive, which would trigger the opportunity to rehabilitate the witness
with a prior consistent statement under FRE 801(d)(1)(B)(i).
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If federal judges are correct that adoption of this amendment will lead to
more frequent attempts to offer prior consistent statements, another danger
presents itself. Sometimes attorneys offer prior consistent statement containing
significant details that were not included in the trial testimony of the declarant. An
important and well-established common law limitation on the use of prior
consistent statements, particularly since they are generally not made under oath, is
that they cannot go beyond what the witness testified to at trial. See Mueller &
Kirkpatrick, id. at §8:38. This is another restriction that will require careful judicial
policing in those cases where prior consistent statements are properly admissible
under the amended rule.

Another possible misinterpretation of the amended rule would be to view it
as eliminating the premotive requirement established by Tome v. United States, 513
U.S. 150 (1995). In Tome the Supreme Court held that a prior consistent statement
offered to rehabilitate a witness impeached by an alleged motive to fabricate, and
hence admissible as substantive evidence under FRE 801(d)(1)(B), must have been
made prior to the time that motive arose.
The primary goal of the earliest advocates for amending the rule was to
overturn Tome and reject the premotive requirement. See Bullock and Gardner,
Prior Consistent Statements and the Premotive Rule, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 509 (1997)
(urging that FRE 801(d)(1)(B) be amended to allow post-motive statements to be
admitted as substantive evidence, thereby overturning Tome). Based on its earlier
drafts and commentary, the Advisory Committee originally appeared to be headed
in this direction. But the Committee apparently had second thoughts about using a
proposed rule amendment to overturn a Supreme Court decision. Thus the
amended rule was submitted to the Supreme Court and promulgated with an
Advisory Committee Note that specifically states: “The amendment retains the
requirement set forth in Tome v. United States . . . that under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) a
consistent statement offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive must have been made before the alleged fabrication or
improper influence or motive arose.”

The question remains whether a post-motive statement, even if not
admissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) as substantive evidence, can nonetheless be
received solely for rehabilitation, as a few courts have permitted. Such a strategy
would seem inconsistent with both Tome and the amended rule. In adopting the
premotive requirement, the Tome Court was stating a common law relevancy
principle as well as interpreting a hearsay rule. It is extremely unlikely that the
Tome Court would have approved the use of the post-motive statements offered in
that case if only a limiting instruction had been given telling the jury they were to be
considered merely for rehabilitation.
To allow post-motive statements for rehabilitation would also go against
both the letter and the spirit of the amended rule. The amended rule states that any
prior consistent statement properly admitted for rehabilitation is now substantive
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evidence. To allow a post-motive statement for rehabilitation only, a court would
have to block the automatic effect of FRE 801(d)(1)(B) by giving a limiting
instruction. But in doing so the court would be returning to a two-tier system where
some prior consistent statements come in as substantive evidence and others only
for rehabilitation. The very purpose of the amendment was to abolish this two-tier
system and eliminate the need for courts to give limiting instructions when prior
consistent statements are properly received for rehabilitation purposes.
Litigators and judges would be well advised to consult both common law
rehabilitation principles as well as Tome when seeking to interpret and apply the
recently-amended language of FRE 801(d)(1)(B).
*By Professor Laird Kirkpatrick, George Washington University Law School, and
Professor Christopher B. Mueller, University of Colorado School of Law
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